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This paper is the first attempt to estimate commercial banks’ efficiency in the Visegrad region 
before joining the EU and also to consider differences in efficiency across the countries. 
Employing Data Envelopment Analysis, we analyze which of the banking sectors is the most 
efficient and whether there has been an improvement in banking intermediation efficiency 
since 1999. Incorporating censored Tobit regression analysis we try to detect whether the 
cross-country differences should be explained by country specific environmental factors or 
internal variables such as profitability, size or foreign ownership. Overall, the results suggest 
that since 1999 there has been, with the exception of Hungary, no improvement in efficiency, 
and its actual level reaches preferably moderate levels. Efficiency differences among 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the collapse of communist regimes all the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) have made major strides in establishing functioning market economies and 
prospects are good that a fairly large group of ten countries will join the EU in May 2004. The 
task of transforming the financial sector in the CEEC into a stable and efficient system, able 
to support economic growth, has been one of the most important issues in transition to 
market-driven economies. The strategic role of financial sector is backed up by a strong 
consensus in the recent relevant literature that well-functioning financial intermediaries have a 
significant impact on economic growth
1. However for example Berglof and Bolton (2002) 
point out in the case of CEEC that there has so far been little correlation between economic 
growth and financial sector development and that one cannot attribute the relatively better 
economic performance of some CEEC to a more developed financial system. But the lack of 
correlation, let alone causality, between growth and finance in the first decade of transition 
does not really come unexpected and can be explained by a variety of reasons. 
 
Beyond the crucial significance of financial system still remains the question whether 
financial sources should come from banks or from capital markets, in other words, whether 
the bank-based system (B-system) or market-based (M-system) should be established. The 
theoretical background as well as assessment of pros and cons of both approaches and their 
applications on CEEC is provided by Polouček et al. (2003). Despite initial political and 
economic preference for M-systems over B-systems, banks have turned out to dominate 
CEEC financial systems. For instance Wagner and Iakova (2001) report that bank assets 
account for 85 to 95 percent of overall financial assets in the larger CEEC and banks can be 
consequently characterized as a core or center point of the financial systems. 
 
Modern banking system should practice three elementary functions. They are 
payments settlement and record keeping, efficient intermediation between savers and 
investors, and the provision of the appropriate system wide liquidity using indirect monetary 
policy instruments. Efficiency of the whole banking sector and fulfillment of all functions are, 
according to Bonin and Wachtel (2002), contingent on two essential assumptions: (i) 
financially strong and independent banks with a governance structure that promotes efficient 
intermediation, (ii) a regulatory system for supervising effectively existing banks and 
licensing prudently new banks. The initial conditions in transition economies made 
constructing both pillars a daunting task. The newly created commercial banks were burdened 
with concentrated loan portfolios, the quality of which was unknown but dubious in a market 
economy. The transition generated macroeconomic turbulence and made any new bank 
lending extremely risky. Initially, the banks were wholly state-owned so that the appropriate 
governance structure was left to be determined in the bank privatization process. The nascent 
regulatory system was based on new legislation modeled on well developed international 
standards but insufficient resources, both infrastructure and human capital, impeded its ability 
to perform tasks effectively. 
 
Surprisingly, there is only few papers studying the ability of banks in the CEEC to 
provide financial intermediation (e.g. Riess et al., 2002) and they analyze the industry as a 
whole using aggregated macro data. Therefore, this paper investigates how efficient is the 
second function of banking sector, i.e. transformation of deposits into investment, in the group 
                                                 
1 For a critical survey and evaluation of the literature on finance and growth, see Wachtel (2001).   2
of Visegrad countries (V4).
2 The V4 banking markets are examined between 1999 and 2002 
using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis approach (DEA). The aim is to 
investigate whether there has been an increase in efficiency following the process of 
convergence with the EU. We also evaluate the determinants of banking efficiency in V4 by 
using the Tobit regression model approach in order to analyze the influence of various 
country-specific and environmental factors on bank efficiency. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section gives a short history of 
restructuring process in V4 banking sectors. Section 3 discusses methodology and its 
strengths and provides a review of the recent literature evaluating banking efficiency by DEA. 
Section 4 describes the data set and deals with the variable selection. Section 5 presents the 
findings and discussion and the final section is the conclusions. 
 
 
2.  RESTRUCTURING OF BANKING SECTORS IN V4 COUNTRIES 
In creating market-driven banking sectors, all V4 countries encountered similar 
problems, notably a substantial amount of bad loans inherited from the communist past and 
the accumulation of new non-performing loans in the early years of transition. The latter was 
due to a combination of factors, in particular an inevitable lack of expertise in commercial 
banking, continued lending of incumbent banks to enterprises from the communist past with a 
doubtful future in an open economy, imprudent or fraudulent lending by a rapidly growing 
number of new banks, and, last but not least, weak banking sector regulation and supervision. 
 
The particular term ￿restructuring of banking sector￿ can be perceived from two basic 
points of view. The broader definition covers radical and significant changes which affect all 
banks in the sector and consequently influence the national economy. The changes in 
ownership structure, implementation of new forms of banking business and new modes of 
delivering banking services, concentration or changes of the banks￿ role in the economy 
belong to the main aspects. The narrower definition of banking sector￿s restructuring is 
considered as specific changes of one individual bank or group of banks with similar 
characteristics. They are mainly tied to the restructuring of credit portfolios and covering the 
losses from non-performing loans by provisions and reserves. Different approaches have been 
followed through the years and among countries in terms of restructuring￿s timing and 
selection of tools and measures used.
3 However the key elements of restructuring schemes in 
all V4 countries can be broadly summarized as follows: privatization of large state-owned 
banks, harmonization of banking legislation with EU standards, improvement of bank 
management and banking supervision.  
 
Despite such differences, all V4 countries have made over more than ten years of 
transformation major strides in setting up banking sectors that are guided by market forces. 
However, V4 banks continue to operate considerably below their potential mainly in 
provision of funds to the domestic economy. They provide less finance than they could and 
their profitability does not usually reach levels that ensure the soundness of banking system. 
In next four sections we present country experiences with the banking sector restructuring. 
                                                 
2 This group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and is called according to the 
Hungarian town of Visegrad, where the agreement of cooperation were signed by presidents of former 
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary on 15 February 1991. 
3 Mainly in attitude towards foreign banks, restructuring and recapitalization, as well as management of non-
performing loans problems.   3
2.1  Restructuring in the Czech Republic 
In the former Czechoslovakia two-tier banking system started to work in January, 
1990.
4 The following period 1990￿93 was distinct by opening the banking market and the 
establishment of many new small banks supplied with domestic capital. The quick growth of 
banking institutions reflected the fact that the banking sector and banking regulation in 
Czechoslovakia emerged at the same time, and thus regulation and supervision developed 
through learning-by-doing process.
5 Establishing of new banks was also pulled by demand 
factors because of the gap between supply and demand of banking products. 
 
Following the first period of optimism and large credit expansion, the Czech banking 
system experienced a period of more restrictive license policy of the Czech National Bank, 
insufficient capital adequacy, non-transparent ownership structure, related lending, asset 
stripping, huge bad loan problems and banks failures. As a result, domestic banks suffered 
losses and large state banks had to be bailed out, while small medium-sized domestic banks 
had to be paid special attention in restructuring and stabilization programs. At the same time, 
banks under foreign control behaved prudently and were profitable (HÆjkovÆ et al., 2002). 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
As it is evident from Table 1, 1995 was the year when the Czech banking sector 
consisted of the most operating banks. Since then, the total number of 55 has been decreasing 
because of revocations of poorly performing banks licenses￿ and the process of mergers and 
acquisitions. The Czech Republic witnessed two bank failures in 2003 and the actual number 
of active banks is 36. The group of small banks was affected by the most dramatic 
development. StavÆrek (2002) points out that small banks lacked a more substantial base of 
primary deposits of its own and were disproportionately engaged in highly risky trades. Small 
banks became dependent on central bank refinancing and later on the interbank deposit 
market. As interest rates on this market were high at the start, these banks concentrated in 
their assets a high proportion of credits and other claims with a presupposed above average 
profitability, which were, however, burdened by a substantial degree of risk. 
 
Not only small banks but also a group of three large state-owned banks - ČS, IPB, and 
KB - were most violently hit by the problem of bad loans. At the same time, cost management 
was very poor and labor productivity low. The weak competition in banking that sustained in 
the second half of 1990s allowed these banks to maintain large interest margins and did not 
force them to reduce costs. Provision and reserve requirements that followed the worsening of 
banks￿ balance sheets led to huge losses that undermined their capital. 
 
The indicator that probably reveals the extent of the problems in the Czech banking 
sector most clearly is the ration of classified loans to total bank credit. Table 1 reports that this 
                                                 
4 In January 1990, the State Bank of Czechoslovakia transferred its commercial banking activities to three newly 
established banks: Komerčn￿ banka (KB), V￿eobecnÆ œverovÆ banka (V￿B) and Investičn￿ banka (IPB). 
Together with ČeskÆ spořitelna (ČS) and SlovenskÆ sporiteľňa (SS) (in operation since 1969), these banks 
dominated the newly developing banking markets. The two other incumbents on the market were 
ČeskoslovenskÆ obchodn￿ banka (ČSOB) and ￿ivnostenskÆ banka (￿B), which, however, specialized in 
international trade financing and large private clients. 
5 Conditions for obtaining banking licenses in the beginning of 1990s were quite soft, requiring a minimum 
subscribed capital of only CSK 50 million. Later on, the low requirement was gradually increased on CZK 500 
million. (CSK stands for Czechoslovak koruna and CZK means Czech koruna).   4
ratio reached 32 percent in 1999.
6 This, along with a desire to finish bank privatization 
quickly, was why the government engaged in extensive clean-ups of the banks￿ loan 
portfolios. The full extend of the bad loans problem was not recognized for several years. So 
far, the public costs of the banking sector transformation have been estimated at over CZK 
250 billion (14 percent of yearly GDP) at least, but some estimates indicate that the final cost 
of bank bailouts in the Czech Republic may approach 30 percent of GDP as compared to just 
over 10 percent for Hungary.
7  
 
The issue of completing the privatization of the state-controlled banks has been 
discussed several times by consecutive Czech governments and has been postponed from year 
to year. As a result, privatization was divided into two independent stages that took place at 
absolutely different time and the first one had negatively affected results of the second one. 
Three of the four large commercial banks participated in voucher privatization in which a 
significant portion of their shares was transferred to individual investors and investment funds 
in exchange for privatization vouchers.
8 These banks participated on both sides of voucher 
privatization as they also sponsored the largest investment funds. As a result, Czech banks 
took ownership stakes in their voucher privatized clients, some of which continued to be loss 
making, while the state retained a controlling ownership stake in the large banks. 
Consequently, voucher privatization in the Czech Republic strengthened the relationship 
between banks and clients and left bank governance held hostage to the legacies of the past. 
 
The second round of privatization occurred from 1998 to 2001 with the sale to 
foreigners of majority equity interests in four large Czech banks: ČSOB, ČS, KB and IPB. 
Subsequent to IPB￿s privatization in 1998 to Nomura Securities, the bank became insolvent, 
was placed under state receivership, and finally merged with ČSOB in 2000. The state￿s 
almost 66 percent stake in ČSOB, the fourth largest bank in the Czech Republic, was sold off 
in June 1999. ČSOB￿s sale at a good price to the Belgian Kredietbank (KBC) is an example of 
a successful privatization resulting in the entry of a reliable and strong investor into the Czech 
banking sector. In case of ČS, the second largest bank, the government called for preliminary 
offers from potential investors in May 1999. In September it started exclusive sale talks with 
Austrian Erste Bank and in March 2000, it signed a contract with that institution about the 
sale of its 52 percent stake for CZK 19 billion. KB was effectively renationalized when 
capital injections in 2000 resulted again in majority state ownership. In June 2001, the Czech 
government sold its interest in KB to SociØtØ GØnØrale so that all of the four major Czech 
banks have now been privatized and have majority foreign owners. 
 
For a long time a characteristic feature of the Czech banking legislation was that 
appropriate changes in banking laws typically followed problems that had emerged. The 
supervisory department was established at the former State Bank of Czechoslovakia in 1991, 
with only eight employees and inadequate legal framework for its operation.
9 The supervision 
of banks started to become more effective only during 1993 and became fully developed 
between 1997 and 1998. Since 1998, the major aim has been to stabilize the banking system 
and harmonize the regulatory framework with EU and international best practices. 
                                                 
6 The problem was most serious in large banks (with more than 40 percent of their loans being classified at the 
end of 1999) and small Czech-owned banks (more than 50 % of their loans classified). 
7 More details about banking restructuring￿s public costs can be found for instance in Polouček et al. (2003). 
8 Using voucher method, 37 percent of ČeskÆ spořitelna￿s shares, 53 percent of Komerčn￿ banka￿s shares and 52 
percent of Investičn￿ a po￿tovn￿ banka￿s shares were sold in 1992. 
9 At that time, the regulation of banks was primarily the responsibility of the federal Ministry of Finance ￿ unlike 
at present.   5
2.2  Restructuring in Hungary 
Hungary was the first CEEC to embark upon a reform of its banking system. In 
contrast to many other CEEC, Hungary already had a two-tired banking system when the 
Berlin Wall came down. The first step was made in 1987 when both central banking and 
commercial banking functions of National Bank of Hungary were separated and, instead of a 




< Table 2 here > 
 
Table 2 illustrates that the total number of operating banks has been stable in the 
Hungarian banking sector. It has been fluctuating around the level of 40 and in 2002, the 
Hungarian banking sector comprised 41 credit institutions and around 200 small savings and 
credit cooperatives. Foreign direct investment became a salient feature of the Hungarian 
banking sector early in the transition process. As a result, at end 2002, foreign shareholders 
held the majority of shares in 31 credit institutions and foreign-owned or controlled banks 
accounted for more than 90 percent of banking sector assets. Concentration in the Hungarian 
banking system is, in contrary to e.g. the Czech sector, moderate and has declined over time.
11 
 
In 1992 when some state-owned banks were significantly undercapitalized, it was 
evident that consolidation and restructuring of the banking sector could no longer be 
postponed. Consolidation began at the end of 1992 and passed through several main stages. 
At the start of the process it was not known whether consolidation should have the form of a 
portfolio clean-up or recapitalization and whether the loan portfolios of banks should be 
shifted away to specialized institutions responsible for work out bad loans or whether the 
work out should be left to the banks, which after all possessed the best information available 
on debtors. 
 
Under the 1993 restructuring program, bad loans were swapped for long-term 
government bonds. Although strengthening banks￿ balance sheets, portfolios deteriorated 
again because of continuing difficulties in Hungary￿s enterprise sector. As a result, many 
state-owned banks became technically insolvent, triggering further government 
recapitalization. While government rescue operations officially finished by end 1995, some 
banks benefited from additional public funds (capital injections and guarantees) to facilitate 
their privatization. The main objective of Hungary￿s bank restructuring program was, 
according to VÆrhegyi (2002), to make banks attractive to investors, and removing 
unrecoverable loans from banks￿ balance sheets and government-financed bank 
recapitalization were the means of getting banks in shape. 
 
The government considered privatization of the state-owned banks as the final step in 
strengthening and stabilizing the banking system. The privatization policy consisted of selling 
controlling shares in state-owned banks to strategic foreign investors as rapidly as possible. In 
general, strategic investors were selected on the basis of the price and the capital injection 
                                                 
10 As in most CEEC, there existed in Hungary, in addition to the monobank, two specialized state-owned banks 
prior to the establishment of the two-tired banking system. These were OTP ￿ National Savings Bank set up to 
provide banking services for households and MKB ￿ Hungarian Foreign Trade Bank specialized in the financing 
of foreign trade. Foreign ownership was present with three joint-venture commercial banks. However their 
market share was small, just about 5 percent in 1990. 
11 The Hungarian banking market has witnessed only two major mergers (ABN Amro with KBC and Bank 
Austria Creditanstalt with HypoVereinsbank).   6
promised and most investors acquired majority stakes or were granted an option to attain 
majority ownership in the future. But there have been two exceptions to this model, namely 
OTP and Postabank, the two largest retail banks. The owners of OTP are foreign institutional 
investors, Hungarian institutional and private investors, and bank employees including 
management. In the case of Postabank, a less conscious government policy produced a 
diversified but not very transparent ownership structure that led to substantial losses and the 
need for bailing out the institution. However, by the end of 1997, four of Hungary￿s five large 
state-owned banks had been sold to foreign owners. 
 
Bank supervision was rather ineffective in Hungary in the first half of the 1990s. This 
was due to a lack of professionalism and independence of the supervisory authority. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, the judicial environment was also rather weak. The 1992 Act on 
Bankruptcy did not provide adequate protection to creditors and resulted in huge bank losses, 
triggering a change in the rules regarding voluntary bankruptcy a year later (VÆrhegyi, 2002).  
What is more, prior to 1997, separate supervisors were in charge of different financial 
services while more and more banks were operating as holding companies - offering a wide 
range of financial services under one roof. This enabled banks to allocate risks within the 
holding, thereby evading capital requirement regulations. In some cases, such a strategy made 
it possible for the management to hide the group￿s capital shortage for many years. To deal 
with these challenges, the supervisors responsible for banks and investment service providers 
were combined in 1997. And then, in 2000, a single organization - the Hungarian Financial 
Supervisory Authority ￿ was established, which also integrated the supervision of insurance 
and pension funds. As SzapÆry (2001) points out, the resulting consolidation of the 
supervisory activities has crowned a great improvement of financial regulation and now 
permits a more effective supervision of financial system. 
 
 
2.3  Restructuring in Poland 
At the end of the centralist regime in Poland the distinction between the central bank 
and commercial banks￿ functions did not exist; the banks functioned in the monobank 
structure. In 1988 there were four state-owned banks that played a supplementary role to the 
National Bank of Poland and specialized in specific banking activities.
12  In the second half of 
the 1980s three new banks were established, and this was an outcome of a modest reform 




Interestingly enough, the reform of the banking sector started already under the 
communist regime, i.e. ahead of a market reform which was prepared in the late autumn 1989 
by the first non-communist government and commenced in January 1990. In January 1989 
two new acts were voted by the Parliament: the Act on Banking and the Act on the National 
Bank of Poland and opened a way for a two-tier system. As a result, commercial activities of 
the National Bank of Poland were transferred to nine newly established banks that emerged 
                                                 
12 These were Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci (PKO) specializing in retail banking and financing of housing 
development, Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej (BGZ), which was a refinancing bank for a network of 
cooperative banks (there were about 1600 of such banks in 1988), Bank Polska Kasa Opieki (PEKAO), which 
collected foreign currency deposits of individuals, and Bank Handlowy (BH), which was financing foreign trade 
and settling foreign indebtedness of Poland. 
13 Namely Bank for Export Development (BRE), BIG Bank, and Development Bank in Lodz.    7
from the central bank￿s local branches. As a result of the reform, there were 18 state-owned 
commercial banks (four ￿old￿ and fourteen ￿new￿). 
 
From the very beginning the National Bank of Poland had pursued quite a liberal 
licensing policy that was accompanied with very low equity requirements.
14 The market 
response was immediate and by the end 1992 there were 54 new domestic banks that had 
emerged since 1990. In general, they were very small and were often established to service 
special sectors of the Polish economy such as agriculture, energy sector or sugar industry. 
Their shareholders hoped to have an easy access to credits and this along with other common 
weaknesses of young transition banking sector soon turned out to cause problems in this 
segment of the banking system and in the Polish banking sector as a whole (Balcerowicz and 
Bratkowski, 2001). 
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
The poor outcome of the liberal entry in the banking sector brought about a dramatic 
change in the licensing policy of the National Bank of Poland and by 1993 the process of 
establishment of solely domestic banks ended (see Table 3). Equity requirements had 
subsequently increased up to the equivalent of ECU 5 million in 1996. In the period from 
1992 to late 1994 reputable foreign banks were not interested in establishing business in 
Poland. This may be easily explained by a poor macroeconomic situation, the country￿s 
indebtedness, and an early stage of economic reform at that time. It was only after the 
agreement with the London Club, that new applications for a banking license were submitted 
by foreign banks (Kwasniak, 2000). 
 
Financial distress of state-owned banks that became evident in 1991 enforced the 
government to evaluate the volume of bad loans and liquidity of banks. The Ministry of 
Finance ordered an external analysis of credit portfolios and the audit showed that credits 
classified as doubtful or loss ranged from 24 to 68 percent. The chosen way of necessary 
restructuring can serve as a dangerous example of combining the resolution of bad loans with 
bank responsibility for enterprise restructuring (Bonin and Wachtel, 2002). The World Bank 
supported a program of bank-led enterprise restructuring based on the notion that the major 
bank creditor had sufficient information about its clients either to promote restructuring or to 
decide on the winding-up of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The main instrument used 
to restructure these loans was debt-equity swaps; the weaker banks chose this option 
disproportionately. Hence, weak banks with no expertise in restructuring large companies 
wound up taking ownership stakes in their weak clients. Thus, bank credit was provided 
regularly to ailing enterprises and no meaningful enterprise restructuring was promoted by 
banks (Gray and Holle, 1996). Poland￿s program strengthened, rather than severed the ties 
between weak banks and their undesirable clients and, thus, provided breathing room for 
ailing SOEs to postpone painful restructuring. Finally, it needs to be added that apart from 
seven state commercial banks, also three specialized banks were recapitalized and with much 
bigger amount.
15 
    
Although the original scheme of state-owned banks￿ privatization was approved in 
March 1991, due to bank￿s financial situation, political instability and a lot of fears and 
prejudices against foreign capital, the privatization process had not started until 1993. In 
                                                 
14 It was only (old) PLN 1.5 billion which represented around USD 268 thousand in 1989 and USD 158 thousand 
in 1990. 
15 In the years 1993-96 PKO, PEKAO, and BGZ received a capital injection of PLN 3.6 billion.   8
addition it was often subject to changes and therefore the whole privatization may be divided 
into three different stages. The first took place from 1993 to 1995 and four banks were 
privatized via IPO with unsatisfactory results. All banks were sold to strategic investors, 
however they obtained only minority stakes while the State Treasury retained a vast share in 
equity. Summing up, by the end 1995 out of nine commercial banks only four were partly 
privatized.  
 
After replacement of pro-reform government by post-communists the policy focus 
shifted from privatization to an administrative consolidation of state-owned banks 
(Balcerowicz and Bratkowski, 2001). Ideologically-driven approach led to a politically 
motivated bank merger, in which the three weakest of the state commercial banks were 
merged with a state savings bank PEKAO to form the largest financial group in Poland. While 
the government was occupied with concepts of consolidation, BH and one of state 
commercial bank arranged their privatization by their own. Both plans were passed through 
approval process in 1997. As a result, the State Treasury deprived itself of decision making, 
the ownership was dispersed, and it was the bank management that governed the bank. 
 
After parliamentary elections in September 1997, a right-wing government came into 
power and speeded up the privatization of the remaining state-owned banks. The PEKAO 
Group was partly sold by IPO in 1998 and 52 percent of shares bought UniCredito with 
Allianz in 1999. The remaining state-owned commercial Bank Zachodni was sold to Allied 
Irish Bank and the rest of Ministry of Finance￿s shares in already privatized banks were sold 
to dominant shareholders, thanks to which the ownership structure became clear. Finally, the 
State Treasury resolved the two cases where due to insider privatization the ownership 
structure was dispersed. Powszechny Bank Kredytowy was taken over by Bank Austria 
Creditanstalt and BH was bought in 2000 by Citibank. 
 
It is not only a fast pace of privatization but also a high pace of mergers and 
acquisitions that are characteristic for the post-restructuring period of the Polish banking 
sector development. In the years 1997 ￿ 2001 23 banks had been taken over or merged and 
mainly foreign owners were instrumental in promoting post-privatization mergers as a means 
of expansion. For more details about mergers see e.g. Balcerowicz and Bratkowski (2001). 
Acceleration of privatization led to a further decrease in state-owned banks￿ share in the 
banking sector as it is apparent from Table 3. Although concentration of the banking sector 
does not reach level as for example in the Czech Republic, it rose recently because it was 
considerably affected by a wave of aforementioned mergers and acquisitions. See Polouček 
(2003) for more information about banking sector concentration in V4 countries. 
 
On 1 January 1998 a new Act on Banking and a new Act on the National Bank of 
Poland came to force. National Bank of Poland introduced a new model of functioning of 
banking supervision. Serving supervision functions, so far belonging to the NBP, was 
assigned to a collegiate organ of public administration - the Commission of Banking 
Supervision. This Commission is supported by the General Inspectorate of Banking 
Supervision (GINB), which remained within the NBP, yet, it was organizationally separated. 
The two new banking laws equipped GINB with increased control and supervisory rights over 
banks. Prudential norms have improved subsequently in recent years, and the regulatory 
framework conforms to prudential guidelines rendered by the Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision, as well as to the EU Council directives and guidelines for the banking sector. 
The only thing which has remained unresolved is the consolidation of the supervision. 
   9
2.4  Restructuring in Slovakia 
 
The Slovak banking sector was developing in early 1990s together with the Czech 
sector in one common state. Therefore, the same features as a rapid growth of the small banks 
number or careless lending approach concluded in similar problems such as bad loans, 
delayed privatization and high public costs as well as in using of similar restructuring 
measures as in the Czech Republic. The independent Slovak banking sector started to operate 
on January 1993 with 15 commercial banks held by foreigners of almost 8 percent. There 
were no foreign bank branches yet on the market at the end 1992. The emerging community 
of commercial banks grappled with largely the same problems as in other V4 countries ￿ in 
particular an unstable and still transforming economic environment, lack of skilled human 
resources, insufficient technical equipment, no software, and others. 
 
< Table 4 here > 
 
As Table 4 reports, at end 1993, the Slovak banking industry comprised 28 banking 
institutions that may be considered as appropriate for such a market from a quantitative point 
of view. However, majority of banks suffered from lack of long-term funds
16, high ratio of 
bad loans in their asset portfolios and insufficient capital adequacy. Slovak banks had to face 
rampant loans defaults, with their share growing relentlessly. But what made the matters 
worse was the upsurge on bad loans classified as loss-making. As this situation had an 
extremely grave impact on savings, pricing policy, banking sector liquidity and the whole 
economy, the National Property Fund decided to pump over SKK 14 billion in fresh capital 
into two of the Slovakia￿s largest banks and some SKK 30 billion worth of their non-
performing loans were taken over by a ￿hospital bank￿. However, these efforts proved futile to 
free banks from their bad loans worries for good and their bad assets have been continually 
rising. 
 
The mutual agreement between National Bank of Slovakia and the Ministry of Finance 
on the first stage of pre-privatization was achieved not sooner than in October 1999. The 
principal task of the concept focused on V￿B and on the largest Slovakia￿s bank SS was to 
ensure a fulfillment of the minimal capital adequacy condition defined by the Basel 
Committee, and to cut the share of classified assets in the banks￿ total assets to 25 ￿ 35 
percent. These goals were again reached by traditional tools - boosting the banks￿ capital and 
spinning off a portion of risky loans from their portfolios. Total costs of the state involvement 
amounted for SKK 132 billion (TkÆčovÆ, 2001).  
 
Besides voucher privatization launched still in the former Czechoslovakia, the real 
privatization process did not begin until early 2001. The contract between Slovak government 
and Austria￿s Erste Bank Sparkassen about sell off of an 87 percent stake in SS was signed on 
January 2001.
17 In 2002, V￿B, the second largest Slovak bank, was bought by Italian 
financial group IntesaBci that obtained 67 percent of shares from the state and 25 percent 
from EBRD and IFC which had participated on V￿B￿s capital earlier. In a consequence of 
privatization, the share of foreign capital in the Slovak banking sector increased to 83 percent. 
 
                                                 
16 Despite a mounting share of time deposits in the banking sector, which alleviates some of the liquidity 
pressures, their maturity structure has long been dominated by short-term deposits. 
17 It means that the same foreign investor became a strategic owner of the Czech and Slovak largest savings 
bank.   10
3.  METHODOLOGY AND REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Farrell (1957) in his pioneer paper distinguishes two components of the efficiency of a 
firm: technical efficiency, which reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximum output from 
a given set of inputs, and allocative efficiency, which indicates the ability of a firm to use the 
inputs in optimal proportions, given their respective prices and the production technology. 
These two measures can be combined to provide a measure of total economic efficiency, or, 
when cost instead of production is considered, cost efficiency. The optimal or most efficient 
production, depending on various circumstances such as the scale of the firm in particular, is 
called efficient frontier. Errors, lags between the choice of the production plan and its 
implementation, human inertia, distorted communications and uncertainty cause deviations 
from the efficient frontier, called X-inefficiency (Leibenstein, 1966). Measuring   
X-inefficiency in financial intermediation in the V4 banking industries is the main subject of 
this paper. 
 
The two approaches used to assess X-efficiency of an entity, parametric (econometric) 
and non-parametric (mathematical programming), employ different techniques to envelop a 
data set with different assumptions for random noise and for the structure of the production 
technology. In this study we use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) as a representative of the 
non-parametric methods. DEA is a mathematical programming approach for the construction 
of production frontiers and the measurement of efficiency relative to the constructed frontiers. 
DEA is based on a concept of efficiency very similar to the microeconomic one; the main 
difference is that the DEA production frontier is not determined by some specific functional 
form, but it is generated from the actual data for the evaluated firms. In other words, the DEA 
frontier is formed as the piecewise linear combination that connects the set of ￿best-practice 
observations￿ in the data set under analysis. As a consequence, the DEA efficiency score for a 
specific decision making unit (DMU) is not defined by an absolute standard, but it is defined 
relative to the other DMUs in the specific data set under consideration (StavÆrek, 2002). 
 
In their original paper, Charnes et al. (1978) proposed a model that had an input 
orientation and assumed constant returns to scale (CRS). Thus, this model identifies 
inefficient units regardless of their scale size. As a result, the use of the CRS specification 
when some DMUs are not operating at optimal scale will result in measures of technical 
efficiency which are confounded by scale efficiencies.
18 Later studies have considered 
alternative sets of assumptions. The assumption of variable returns to scale (VRS) was first 
introduced by Banker et al. (1984). The input-oriented VRS model for the DMU0 can be 
written formally as: 
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18 The fact that banks face non-constant returns to scale has been documented empirically by, among others, 
McAllister and McManus (1993), and Wheelock and Wilson (1999).   11
where     Θ0   is the technical efficiency of DMU0 to be estimated 
   λj   is a n-dimensional constant to be estimated 
   y rj   is the observed amount of output of the r
th type for the j
th DMU 
   x ij   is the observed amount of input of the i
th type for the j
th DMU 
   r    indicates  the  different  s outputs 
   i  indicates  the  different  m inputs 
   j  indicates  the  different  n DMUs. 
 
The VRS efficiency scores are also called pure technical efficiency scores and they are 
obtained by running the above model for each DMU. The VRS model eliminates the scale 
part of efficiency from the analysis, and therefore, the CRS efficiency score for each DMU 
does not exceed the VRS efficiency score. 
 
Cross-country studies using DEA face the problem of heterogeneous environment in 
analyzed countries. The term ￿environment￿ describes factors that could influence efficiency 
of a firm, where such factors are not traditional inputs and are not under control of 
management (Casu and Molyneux, 2000). Such factors can include ownership differences, 
location characteristics, macroeconomic conditions or government regulation. 
 
Several models have been proposed to incorporate environmental effects into a DEA 
based evaluation of producer efficiency. These models can be grouped into one-stage models 
and two stage models. One-stage models use data on outputs, inputs and observable 
environmental variables all at once, the objective being to control for observable 
environmental variables in the evaluation of producer performance. However these models 
are deterministic, and so fail to account for the effect of statistical noise. Their 
implementation also requires that the direction (if not the magnitude) of each included 
environmental effect should be known in advance. Two-stage models use data on outputs and 
inputs in the first stage, and use data on observable environmental variables in the second 
stage, the objective being to determine the impact of the observable environmental variables 
on initial evaluations of producer performance. If the second stage is DEA-based, the 
resulting two-stage model is fully deterministic, and incapable of accounting for the effect of 
statistical noise on producer performance. However if the second stage is regression-based, 
this model is capable of attributing some portion of the variation in producer performance to 
the effect of statistical noise (Fried et al., 2002).
19 
 
A commonly held view in previous studies is that the use of Tobit model can handle 
the characteristics of the distribution of efficiency measures and thus provide results that can 
guide policies to improve performance. DEA efficiency measures obtained in the first stage 
are the dependent variables in the second stage censored Tobit model in order to allow for the 
restricted (0, 1] range of DEA efficiency scores. Estimation with an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression of Θ0  would lead to a biased parameter estimate since OLS assumes a 
normal and homoscedastic distribution of the disturbance and the dependent variable (Jackson 





                                                 
19 The typical two-stage approach was pioneered by Timmer (1971). In this approach a first stage DEA exercise 
is followed by a second stage regression analysis seeking to explain variation in first stage efficiency scores in 
terms of a vector of observable environmental variables.   12
The standard Tobit model can be defined as follows for DMU0: 
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where ε0 ~ N(0, σ
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3, x0 and β are vectors of explanatory variables and unknown parameters, 
respectively. The y
*
0 is a latent variable and y0 is the DEA score. 
 
The likelihood function (L) is maximized to solve β and σ based on observations of 
explanatory variables and DEA scores. 
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The first product is over the observations for which the banks are 100 percent efficient (y=0) 
and the second product is over the observations for which banks are inefficient (y>0). F0 is the 
distribution function of the standard normal evaluated β
´x0/σ. 
 
Efficiency and financial performance of banks and other financial institutions are very 
frequently discussed topics in economic literature. Sherman and Gold (1985) were one of the 
first researchers to use the nonparametric approach to evaluate and compare the performances 
of banks. Berger and Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies that apply frontier efficiency 
analyses to financial institutions in 21 countries. They report that the majority of these studies 
are confined to the U.S. banking sector, and call for the need to do further research in this area 
outside the United States.
20 The method has been also gradually applied for cases in Norway, 
Spain, U.K., France, Italy, Japan, Singapore, Poland, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Turkey, 
Kuwait, and several other countries. There is also a set of literature which uses DEA for 
cross-country comparisons. 
 
The X-efficiency literature on cross-country comparisons of banking institutions has 
two perspectives. One deals with comparison of foreign-owned banks with domestic-owned 
banks in the context of a single country. The other concentrates on cross-country comparisons 
among banking institutions. In the first category, the local business environmental factors are 
ignored as banks compete in the same market within the country.
21 In the second category of 
this literature, the papers either did not adjust for country specific local environmental 
conditions or norms and defined a common efficiency frontier or incorporated the country-
specific environmental conditions as was described above. Most of the studies are based on 
                                                 
20 Only DEA, as a one of non-parametric approaches, has been used to construct banking efficiency frontiers 
evaluating U.S. data alone in more than 30 published articles. 
21 Studies focused on U.S. market, e.g. Hasan and Hunter (1996), Mahajan et al. (1996), DeYoung and Nolle 
(1996), Chang et al. (1998), and Peek et al. (1999) usually portrayed foreign-owned banks as relatively less 
efficient than their domestic counterparts. However, these findings do not correspond with similar comparisons 
in non-U.S. settings. Vander Vennet (1996) or Hasan and Lozano-Vivas (1998) found no significant differences 
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banking institutions from EU countries and generally the results did not produce any definite 
status.
22 However, there is still a lack of cross-country analyses evaluating banking efficiency 
in CEEC
23. To fill in the existing gap in financial literature we use two-stage approach in 
which efficiency of banking intermediation carried out by DEA model allowing VRS is 




4.  DATA AND SELECTION OF VARIABLES 
The analysis is based on data banks representing more than 90 percent of the total 
banking assets in all V4 countries. As we foresaw arguments concerning the reliability of 
some of the indicators in an environment where serious false reports and non-compliance 
could take place we selected the sample period for this study on the end stage of 
transformation process, particularly from 1999 to 2002, to minimize the extend of the 
problems.  While describing the data, it is necessary to note that composition of the dataset 
changed slightly over the period analyzed because data from all banks are not available for 
every year (mainly in 1999) and also mergers reduced the total number of evaluated banks 
(2002). Therefore the set under estimation contains 59 banks in 1999, 72 banks in 2000, 70 
banks in 2001, and 62 banks in 2002.
24 All data were extracted from the banks￿ official  
end-of-year unconsolidated balance sheets and financial statements based on international 
accounting standards. All data reported in local currencies were converted into EUR as a 
reference currency using official exchange rates.
25 We analyzed only commercial banks 
(some of them originally performed as savings banks) that are operating as independent legal 
entities. All foreign branches, building societies, mortgage banks, specialized banks or credit 
unions were excluded from the estimation set. 
 
In the banking literature, there is a considerable disagreement on the perception of the 
banking activities￿ principle and on the explicit definition and measurement of banks￿ inputs 
and outputs. A fundamental difficulty arises in the treatment of bank deposits. Long-lasting 
debate in the literature surrounds the input-output status of deposits. Traditionally, deposits 
                                                 
22 For instance, Berg et al. (1993) found overall average efficiency of 0.58 for Finland, 0.78 for Norway and 0.89 
for Sweden; European Commission (1997) found average efficiency levels in the EU of 0.73; Pastor et al. 
(1997a) report average efficiency levels equal to 0.79 and Dietsch and Weill (1998) found average efficiency 
levels in the EU of 0.64. In a broader context, Pastor et al. (1997b) applied DEA to 427 banks from 8 developed 
countries. They found a mean efficiency value of 0.86, with the highest efficiency value of 0.95 for France and 
the lowest efficiency value of 0.55 for the U.K. According to Bikker (1999), Spanish banks appeared to be the 
least efficient ones, followed by banks in France and Italy, whereas banks in Luxembourg were most efficient, 
followed by banks in Belgium and Switzerland. On average, banks in Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K. 
took a medium position. Casu and Girardone (2002) concluded that majority of large banks operating in the 
single EU market obtained efficiency scores about 0.65, while banks from the U.K. appeared as the most 
efficient whereas Italian and Spanish banks occupied the last positions. 
23 We may mention, among rare examples, StavÆrek and Polouček (2003) who analyzed V4 banking sectors 
together with Finland and Belgium and reported lower intermediation as well as operating efficiency in V4 
countries then in two selected EU countries. Other study, Grigorian and Manole (2002), incorporated 17 
countries into analysis and found that with the exception of 1997, banks in Central Europe are more efficient in 
both revenue generating and the ability to provide financial services than banks from Southern and Eastern 
Europe and from the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
24 The geographical distribution among individual countries is reported in Tables 5a ￿ 5d. 
25 To convert values from local currencies we may use either the official exchange rate or the purchasing power 
parity rate as computed by the OECD. According to Berg et al. (1993) the two approaches seem to yield very 
similar results.   14
are regarded as the main ingredients for loan production and the acquisition of other earning 
assets. On the other hand, high value-added deposit products, like integrated savings and 
checking accounts, investment trusts and foreign currency deposit accounts tend to highlight 
the output characteristics of deposits. Indeed, high value-added deposit services are an 
important source of commissions and fee revenue for specialized commercial banks such as 
trust and private banks. In the context of these specialized institutions, one cannot afford to 
ignore the output nature of deposits (Leong et al., 2002). Extending this argument further, one 
might contend that the classification of deposits should therefore depend on the structure and 
characteristics of banks in the representative sample and viewed in the regulatory context of 
the country in question. For example, since the magnitude of high value-added deposits is 
relatively small compared to time and savings deposits in V4 countries, there may be more 
reason to regard deposits as inputs in these circumstances. 
 
Three main approaches have been developed to define the input-output relationship in 
financial institution behavior in the literature. Firstly, the production approach (Sherman and 
Gold, 1985) views financial institutions as producers of deposit and loan accounts, defining 
output as the number of such accounts or transactions. This method usually defines inputs as 
the number of employees and capital expenditures on fixed assets. Second, the intermediation 
approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) stems directly from the traditional role of financial 
institutions as intermediaries that convert financial assets from surplus units into deficit units. 
Operating and interest costs are usually the major inputs, whereas interest income, total loans, 
total deposits and non-interest income form the principal outputs. Third, the asset approach 
recognizes the primary role of financial institutions as creators of loans. In essence, this 
stream of thought is a variant of the intermediation approach, but instead defines outputs as 
the stock of loan and investment assets (Favero and Papi, 1995). 
 
Intermediation approach seems to have dominated empirical research in this area and 
also we adopt for the definition of inputs and outputs the original approach proposed by 
Sealey and Lindley (1977) with a small modification. It assumes that the bank collects 
deposits to transform them, using labor and capital, in loans. We determined the appropriate 
number of inputs and outputs with a respect on the dataset size and consequently employed 
three inputs (labor, capital, and deposits), and two outputs (loans and net interest income).
26 
We measure labor by the total personnel costs (PC) covering wages and all associated 
expenses, capital by the book value of fixed assets (FA), and deposits by the sum of demand 
and time deposits from customers and interbank deposits (TD). Loans are measured by the net 
value of loans to customers and other financial institutions (TL) and net interest income as the 
difference between interest incomes and interest expenses (NII). See Tables 5a ￿ 5d for a 
descriptive statistics of inputs, outputs, and total banks￿ assets (TA) in 1999 and 2002. 
 
< Tables 5a ￿ 5d here > 
 
To further investigate the determinants of efficiency of financial intermediation in V4 
banking sectors we follow aforementioned two-stage approach with a Tobit regression. Using 
the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA evaluations as the dependent variable, we then 
estimate the following regression mode already employed by e.g. Casu and Molyneux (2000). 
                                                 
26 Under the non-parametric approach which will be implemented in our empirical analysis, increasing the 
number of variables reduces the number of technically inefficient observations. Therefore, in order to minimize 
this possible drawback of the methodology, we restricted our choice of variables to a three-input, two-output 
model. 
   15
Θj = β1CZE + β2HUN + β3POL + β4SVK + β5ROAE + β6EOTA + β7TA + β8FO + εj            (11) 
 
where    
 
CZE, HUN, POL, SVK  are dummy variables indicating the country of origin of the bank  
         (equal to one if based in the country and equal to zero otherwise) 
ROAE     is  the  return  on  average  equity; 
ΕΟΤΑ         is the ratio of equity on total assets; 
TA        is the sum of assets; 
FO        is dummy variable indicating type of ownership (equals to one if  
         foreign-owned and equals to zero otherwise).
27 
  
These variables represent aspects of the bank￿s environment that may influence 
efficiency, but which are outside the immediate control of company management. There is 
clearly the potential for disagreement on exactly what kind of variables can meet these 
criteria. We implemented profitability and capital ratios to test conclusions of the empirical 
literature (e.g. Casu and Molyneux, 2000, Pastor et al., 1997b, or Jackson and Fethi, 2000) 
about mutual relations between efficiency, profitability and capital adequacy in the 
environment of transition economy. We introduce the variable FO to detect whether foreign 
ownership influences efficiency in a positive way as a widely held understanding says. 
 
 
5.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
5.1  Efficiency estimation 
Following the methodology described, we evaluated the efficiency of all banks in the 
estimation set and calculated DEA efficiency scores obtained by running separate programs 
for the CRS model and for the VRS model.
28 We pooled the cross-country data and used them 
to define a common best-practice efficiency frontier. This allowed us to focus on determining 
the relative differences in performances across banking industries. The same approach was 
previously followed by Berg et al. (1993), Pastor et al. (1997b), Casu and Molyneux (2000), 
Dietsch and Weill (2000) or Grigorian and Manole (2002). Table 6a and Table 6b report 
elementary statistics of efficiency scores obtained relative to the whole sample considering 
CRS and VRS respectively. 
 
< Table 6a and Table 6b here > 
 
One can point out that VRS efficiency scores are considerably higher than ones of 
CRS and also that the efficiency frontier using VRS model consisted of more DMUs than the 
CRS frontier. It is possible to detect an improvement of average efficiency between 1999 and 
2001, however followed by a significant drop even below the initial level in the case of VRS 
approach. Figures 1a ￿ 1h illustrates the frequency distribution of efficiency scores over the 
period of analysis. The majority of DMUs comprising the sample seem to cluster around the 
level of efficiency 0.50 and 0.90 considering CRS and VRS respectively. This is absolutely in 
                                                 
27 If the bank is owned by an institution from any other transition country, it is considered as domestic-owned. 
This approach was viewed as a good method to restrict foreign ownership only on ownership from developed 
countries. 
28 We used the EMS software, version 1.3.0, by Holger Scheel for the DEA scores calculation.   16
accordance with results of other recent studies on European bank efficiency using DEA. See 
footnotes 22 and 23 for reminding. 
 
< Figures 1a ￿ 1h here > 
  
Also in comparison with findings of Berger and Humprey (1997) the figures show 
signs of average performance. They surveyed, as mentioned earlier, 130 studies (122 of which 
were focused on depository financial institutions), applying frontier efficiency analysis (using 
parametric as well as non-parametric methods) to financial institutions in 21 countries. They 
drew to the conclusion that the mean value of average efficiencies was 0.79, with a standard 
deviation of 0.13, and a range of 0.31 to 0.97. Considering only 69 applications of non-
parametric techniques, the mean average efficiency was 0.72, with a standard deviation of 
0.17. Results of our study are not poles apart. 
 
The Czech banking sector appeared as the most efficient reaching the highest average 
efficiency scores in both CRS and VRS model. Considering CRS, all banking sectors with the 
exception of Hungary obtained in 2002 nearly the same efficiency levels like in 1999. The 
Czech banking industry is more efficient of 1.4 percentage points (p.p.), the Polish of 2.1 p.p. 
and the Slovak reached in 2002 the average score of 7.8 p.p. lower than in 1999. The Czech 
banking sector entered the period of analysis with an advance of almost 20 p.p. ahead of the 
other countries however it was caught up by the Hungary￿s sector in 2002 that had improved 
its efficiency of 20 p.p from 0.545 to 0.745. Resembling developments are also evident in the 
VRS approach￿s results. One can define the Czech Republic along with Hungary as a leading 
group with highest average efficiency that reached levels around 0.83. Whereas the Czech 
final and initial efficiencies did not differ significantly, the analysis has witnessed a dramatic 
growth of the Hungary￿s banks efficiency of more than 10 p.p. Poland and Slovakia stood 
apart with a gap of 12 p.p. and 28 p.p respectively. Figures 2a and 2b summarize the findings 
graphically. 
 
< Figure 2a and Figure 2b here > 
 
The explanation of generally lower intermediation efficiency in transition countries 
can be found in a couple of factors. Above all, past bad loans, low credit scores of the 
majority of potential borrowers, the dormant capacity of lending to households. In 2001, loans 
to households amounted to 6.5 percent of GDP in the Czech Republic and 6 percent of GDP 
in Hungary whereas it was 30 percent of GDP in Austria. In addition, much of the investment 
in transition countries has been realized by foreign investors either with their own financial 
resources, or with connections to foreign banks and foreign capital. As a result, potential 
borrowers and clients of the first quality have brushed aside the banks as well as capital 
markets in transition countries regardless of the method of investment (privatization, merger 
and acquisition or ￿green-field￿ investment). As a consequence of high interest rates, a 
considerable number of domestic companies have decided to finance their business activities 
from abroad, obtaining resources from foreign banks and reducing, in this manner, capital 
costs. The indebtedness of companies at home as well as abroad had the same levels only in 
the Czech Republic; with the rest of the V4 countries, the indebtedness abroad was 
substantially higher. 
 
Besides the analysis of average efficiency scores of all banking sectors, undoubtedly 
interesting is to expose the composition of efficiency frontiers. One can suppose that the more   17
efficient banking sector the more banks originating from it are placed at the efficiency 
frontier. The national structure of the frontier is provided in Tables 7a and 7b. 
 
< Table 7a and Table 7b here > 
 
As it is apparent from figures above, the results obtained show differences between 
efficiencies allowing VRS and efficiencies based on CRS. Recall that the CRS efficiency 
score is a product of technical and scale efficiency, and VRS measures purely technical 









=                            (12) 
yields a measure of the relative scale efficiency of bank j. If Sj = 1, this means that bank n is 
operating at the most efficient scale size. If it is less than one, this means there is scale 
inefficiency for bank j. Thus, (1-Sj) represents the relative scale inefficiency of a bank. The 
units that are CRS-efficient will also be scale-efficient, since scale was already factored in the 
CRS model. Thus, the two are equal. The units that are VRS-efficient, but inefficient in the 
CRS model, have a scale inefficiency. Since they were technically efficient, all of the 
inefficiencies picked up by CRS are due to scale. However this ratio does not indicate 
whether the banks with scale inefficiency are too small or too big. To detect not only the 
extend of scale inefficiency but also its direction we modified the ratio and replaced the CRS 
efficiency by non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) efficiency and VRS efficiency by the 
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) efficiency score. Thus, the scale inefficiency higher 
than zero predicates about too big bank and inefficiency lower than zero identifies too small 
banks from the point of view of the input orientated DEA model. Average scale inefficiencies 
of all banking sectors are presented in Table 8. 
 
< Table 8 here > 
 
We may summarize that the Czech banks suffer from the lowest scale inefficiency 
followed by the Slovak banks. However, the Slovakia￿s banking sector is the only one that 
composes from too small banks comparing with their counterparts from other V4 countries. 
Second most important feature is a noticeable reduction of scale inefficiency in Hungary and 
Poland. The results show that the largest banks were the most efficient using the VRS model. 
It is quite a common finding for many other studies that smaller banks dominate the frontier 
in the CRS model, while in the VRS model, frontier banks are on average much larger (e.g. 
Berg et al. (1993) or Vujcic and Jemric (2002) came to the same conclusion). 
 
We are aware of the fact that averaging without any respect to the size of banks causes 
loss of information, and therefore, we implemented in our analysis a size-adjusted average 
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where     ΑΜ  is the size-adjusted average efficiency; 
      w j        is the weight computed as a share of j
th DMU￿s assets on  
         total assets of all estimated DMUs; 
   Θj  is the observed efficiency for the j
th DMU; and 
   j  indicates  the  different n DMUs.    18
Development of the size-adjusted average efficiency is portrayed in Figures 3a and 3b. 
 
< Figure 3a and Figure 3b here > 
 
The size-adjusted average efficiency can be used for analysis of the issue of optimal 
bank size by comparing with ￿simple￿ average efficiency scores. Considering CRS model the 
adjusted average efficiency is in all counties during the whole period analyze lower than the 
simple average efficiency. This indicates that the smaller banks perform better than the larger 
ones. Hence, in the case of common efficiency analysis, we can generalize, that larger banks 
mainly operate at the wrong scale. Mainly in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the amount of 
banks￿ total deposits is not fully utilized and thus, exceeds the total volume of loans and 
services provided. On the contrary, the scale inefficiency in Poland and, to a lesser extent, 
Hungary, stems from a great number of medium-sized banks which perform badly due to their 
high fixed costs in relation to their limited market shares. This finding corresponds to the 
rather low concentration of Polish and Hungarian banking sectors. Allowing banks to operate 
with VRS, the overall picture changed dramatically. The size-adjusted efficiency scores 
surpassed the simple efficiency ones. 
 
 
5.2  Explaining differences in efficiency 
An exploration of inter-company and cross-country differences in efficiency 
necessitates a two-stage analysis whereby efficiency scores from the first-stage DEA process 
are regressed against environmental variables. We used DEA scores obtained from the VRS 
estimation. By definition, these environmental variables are not decision variables which 
would otherwise figure in the firm￿s choice of the nature or level of inputs and/or outputs (as 
these should have already been included in the DEA analysis). Problems can arise if the 
environmental variables are co-determined or even highly correlated with the DEA inputs or 
outputs as this can lead to biased estimates in the regression analysis. Since VRS DEA 
efficiency scores are naturally dependent on the size of the DMU, there will be an inevitable 
correlation between any second-stage size variable and DEA inputs/outputs. Descriptive 
statistics of selected environmental variables for all years is provided in Tables 9a ￿ 9d. 
 
< Table 9a - Table 9d here > 
 
 This study uses company size as an one of key environmental variables on basis that 
management cannot easily use size as a decision variable. Since the Pearson correlation 
coefficient between inputs, outputs and total assets is extremely high (ranging from 0.711 to 
0.976), it is preferable to use the natural logarithm of total assets is EUR thousand instead of 
the sum of total assets. The results of the Tobit regression that are significant at 95 percent 
level or higher are presented in Table 10.
29 
 
< Table 10 here > 
 
The yearly results differ in some aspects but these, on the other hand, reflect important 
development tendencies explaining banking efficiency determinants. Considering profitability 
we found its positive effects on efficiency of V4 banks during the whole period of analysis. 
One can observe the growing statistical significance of ROAE, and accepting 95 percent level, 
                                                 
29 The Tobit regression was computed with EasyReg by Herman J. Bierens.   19
ROAE appears as statistically significant in 2001 and 2002. These findings indicate that more 
profitable banks have higher efficiency, which corresponds with findings of some previous 
studies, e.g. Pastor et al. (1997b), Carbo et al. (1999), Jackson and Fethi (2000) or to certain 
extend StavÆrek and Polouček (2003). Banks reporting higher profitability ratios are usually 
seen by clients as preferential and attract therefore the biggest share of deposits as well as the 
best potential borrowers. Such conditions create a favorable environment for the profitable 
banks to be more efficient from the point of view of financial intermediation.
30 On the other 
hand, there is a sign of negative influence of the capital adequacy variable EOTA on banks￿ 
efficiency except 1999. However the negative coefficients are not statistically significant at 
the selected level. The Basel ratio might be a more appropriate indicator of capital adequacy 
since it distinguishes a risk level of particular assets and thus it better mirrors the 
intermediation efficiency. 
 
The relationship between bank￿s size and efficiency is rather mixed. There is an 
evidence of positive sign in three out of four estimations however the statistically significant 
relationship is only found to hold in 2000 and 2001. One can consider this kind of results as a 
verification of U-shaped relationship between size and efficiency, i.e. both small and large 
banks appear to have higher efficiency scores and the most dangerous or slippery territory 
belongs to medium-sized banks. Another coefficient with growing significance is FO 
representing the ownership dummy. During the whole period of estimation the coefficient has 
a positive sign and in the last two years is statistically significant at 95 percent level. Banks 
with controlling foreign ownership are likely to be more efficient than their domestically 
owned counterparts (including state-owned and private domestic). This should come as no 
surprise because of the ability of foreign owned banks to capitalize on their access to better 
risk management and operational techniques, which is usually made available through their 
parent banks abroad. In addition, as foreign ownership is likely to be concentrated, foreign 
owned banks are less prone to typical corporate governance conflict between (dispersed) 
owners and the management. The relevance of foreign ownership￿s positive impact on 
efficiency of banks in V4 countries confirm outcomes of Grigorian and Manole (2002) who as 
ones of very few researches carried out cross-country analysis of banking efficiency in 
European transition countries. 
 
However the most noticeable finding is that the differences between efficiencies 
across V4 banking sectors stem mainly from country specifics implemented into analysis by 
country dummies. Their coefficients are the highest and in all estimations statistically 
significant. These results are absolutely in accordance with Pastor et al. (1997b), Casu and 
Molyneux (2000) and Grigorian and Manole (2002) who also concluded in like manner. It 
means that in spite of common features￿ existence the autonomous factors play a crucial role 
in affecting banking efficiency. One can highlight, among others, aforementioned method of 
financial sector restructuring, its timing and sequencing along with measures used, and, last 
but not least, the legal and regulatory framework that vary among V4 countries. Conditions of 
banking activities such as capital adequacy, single borrower exposure limits, foreign exchange 
exposure, liquidity limits, rules for reserves and provisions creating and other prudential 
behavior standards belong among factors significantly influencing banking efficiency.  The 
second group of country specifics consists of factors that generate a potential for efficient 
financial intermediation. We may distinguish macroeconomic development, level of GDP per 
capita, restructuring of the enterprise sector, foreign direct investment inflow, tendency to 
                                                 
30 For more about mutual relationship between banking efficiency and profitability see StavÆrek and Polouček 
(2003).   20
savings and investments, proportion of customer deposits and interbank deposits, and quality 




6.  CONCLUSION 
Reported results allow us to conclude that even after almost thirteen years after the end 
of communist period in the history of Central Europe, and in spite of transformation, 
restructuring, convergence process and harmonization before joining the European Union that 
took place in all countries, the V4 countries does not represent a homogenous club of identical 
economies as they are often reckoned for and their banks have not improved their efficiency 
remarkably since 1999. 
 
According to average efficiency of banking intermediation in 2002, the V4 banking 
industries can be distinguished as more and less efficient. Generally, the Czech and Hungarian 
banking sectors were on average evaluated as the most efficient followed, with a non-
marginal distance, by the Polish banking industry. The Slovak banking sector stands apart 
with a substantial gap in efficiency scores. One of the clearest results of the study is a 
noteworthy increase of the Hungarian sector￿s average efficiency that may be explained by 
positive effects of relatively fast and successfully performed restructuring and privatization of 
the largest banks and banking system as a whole. Efficiency of the leaders does not differ 
significantly from the results of previous studies focusing mainly on the EU banking markets. 
However the results were obtained from estimations based on different data and therefore we 
are far from conclusion that the efficiency of the best performers among V4 countries equals 
to average efficiency within EU countries. Some attempts to evaluate banks from EU 
candidate and member countries together (e.g. StavÆrek and Polouček, 2003) imply that 
banking sectors of transition countries are less efficient than their counterparts in EU member 
countries. Nevertheless, efficiency of Slovakia￿s banks is undoubtedly deeply below the level 
considered as a standard in EU as well as in the Czech Republic or Hungary. 
 
Despite privatization, and the dominance of foreign banks, the banking industries in 
the V4 countries remained underdeveloped in terms of provision of credit to enterprises and 
households. The depth of financial intermediation was quite low in the V4 countries. 
However, efficiency is expected to improve with the development of the economy in general, 
and likewise, the development of small and medium enterprises in particular. Loans to 
households are also expected to rise as a consequence of growth in household incomes as well 
as efforts of banks to expand and diversify their activities. 
 
Although there is an evidence of statistically significant factors influencing banks￿ 
efficiency in the whole V4 group such as profitability, foreign ownership or to certain extend 
also size of a bank, the majority of differences should be cleared up by a heterogeneous 
environment in particular countries. From these results, we may conclude that country 
specific factors are still, in spite of globalization, integration, harmonization and other similar 
developments and processes, important determinants in explaining differences in banking 
efficiency levels in V4 countries.   21
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       Banking sector indicators in the Czech Republic                      Table 1 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
No. of banks  52 55 55 53 50 45 42 40 38 
No. of foreign-owned banks  18 21 23 23 24 25 27 26 26 
state-owned banks % of 
total sector’s assets  11.9 17.9 17.6 16.6 17.5 18.6 23.1 28.2  3.8 
bad loans % of total loans    36.0 26.6 27.4 27.0 26.7 32.2 23.6 21.5 
credit to private sector % 
of GDP  51.0 50.3 46.7 47.1 54.7 48.8 43.8 41.4 45.1 
broad money % of GDP  70.6 73.6 75.3 71.3 73.0 71.2 75.4 77.6 78.9 
      Source: Czech National Bank, EBRD (2001) 
 
 
       Banking sector indicators in Hungary                               Table 2 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
No. of banks  40 43 42 42 46 45 44 43 41 
No. of foreign-owned banks  15 17 21 25 30 27 27 30 30 
state-owned banks % of 
total sector’s assets  74.9 62.8 52.0 16.3 10.8 11.8  9.1  8.6  9.0 
bad loans % of total loans  29.6  20.2  12.1  9.0 5.3 6.8 4.4 3.1 3.4 
credit to private sector % 
of GDP  20.7 21.4 18.6 18.7 20.4 20.0 20.8 23.2 23.0 
broad money % of GDP  56.8 52.2 48.7 48.6 47.3 45.8 46.2 46.3 46.8 
      Source: National Bank of Hungary, Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority, EBRD (2001) 
 
 
       Banking sector indicators in Poland                         Table 3 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
No. of banks  87 82 81 81 83 83 77 74 71 
No. of foreign-owned banks  10 11 18 25 29 31 39 47 49 
state-owned banks % of 
total sector’s assets  86.2 80.4 71.7 69.8 51.6 48.0 24.9 24.0 22.1 
bad loans % of total loans  36.4 34.0 23.9 14.7 11.5 11.8 14.5 15.9 17.8 
credit to private sector % 
of GDP  12.2 12.0 12.7 15.9 17.1 17.6 18.8 18.8 19.3 
broad money % of GDP  35.9 36.7 36.1 37.2 39.6 40.2 43.1 42.0 45.1 
      Source: National Bank of Poland, EBRD (2001) 
 
 
      Banking sector indicators in Slovakia                         Table 4 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
No. of banks  28 29 33 29 29 27 25 23 21 
No. of foreign-owned banks  13 14 18 14 13 11 10 13 13 
state-owned banks % of 
total sector’s assets  70.7 66.9 61.2 54.2 48.7 50.0 50.7 49.1 22.7 
bad loans % of total loans  12.2 30.3 41.3 31.8 33.4 44.3 32.9 26.2 21.8 
credit to private sector % 
of GDP  30.4 23.0 26.3 30.4 42.1 43.9 40.5 37.6 37.7 
broad money % of GDP  63.9 64.3 65.4 68.7 66.2 62.1 64.6 58.9 60.1 
     Source: National Bank of Slovakia, EBRD (2001)  25
         Inputs and outputs descriptive statistics                 Tables  5a  –  5d 
 
 
         
Czech Republic (1999)  -  17 banks  Czech Republic (2002)  -  16 banks 
 mean  med  st.dev. min  max   mean  med  st.dev. min  max 
TD  2 376 032  923 9237  3 292 968  4 040  9 808 964 TD  3 116 281  1 063 690  4 578 090  17 864  14 382 424 
PC  27 225  8 542  42 533  537  139 364 PC  42 399  13 242  63 521  646  184 371 
FA  84 439  11 833  136 748  745  458 974 FA  90 979  14 518  162 747  453  535 529 
TL  1 909 428  743 408  2 576 300  18 506  8 594 644 TL  2 813 827  1 008 199  3 958 209  34 835  11 777 198 
NII  60 623  21 156  94 345  312  343 427 NII  102 908  27 208  159 908  1 517  458 795 
TA  2 885 523  1 070 088  3 916 222  30 976  11 905 817 TA  4 007 395  1 274 512  6 005 072  36 502  19 313 197 
Hungary (1999)  -  14 banks  Hungary (2002)  -  12 banks 
 mean  med  st.dev. min  max   mean  med  st.dev. min  max 
TD  1 252 080  831 891  1 386 871  210 938  5 961 814 TD  1 825 718  1 080 201  2 091 652  416 021  8 304 447 
PC  22 717  12 081  23 444  4 089  96 034 PC  35 134  27 663  36 364  6 150  148 752 
FA  37 950  10 596  48 134  4 650  164 485 FA  41 928  15 730  58 223  4 169  205 058 
TL  845 810  686 322  691 808  133 522  2 990 091 TL  1 459 041  924 249  1 397 106  234 291  5 234 123 
NII  63 040  41 700  79 270  5 176  332 181 NII  99 352  70 165  110 862  12 248  422 211 
TA  1 562 969  1 088 602  1 631 984  232 514  6 989 484 TA  2 196 203  1 350 010  2 486 586  460 623  9 824 588 
Poland (1999)  -  17 banks  Poland (2002)  -  21 banks 
 mean  med  st.dev. min  max   mean  med  st.dev. min  max 
TD  2 040 725  1 593 356  2 589 972  5 849  10 982 585 TD  3 468 497  997 917  5 024 733  30 123  21 855 455 
PC  50 637  48 231  67 873  1 210  294 513 PC  89 770  18 008  173 018  2 834  814 522 
FA  85 797  65 122  117 576  1 480  500 612 FA  122 054  21 973  164 124  1 882  602 452 
TL  1 528 191  1 191 856  1 753 410  10 300  7 371 177 TL  2 563 010  1 042 101  3 176 295  27 294  12 455 222 
NII  98 452  69 054  114 861  5 425  483 336 NII  154 244  42 677  251 897  265  1 033 164 
TA  2 597 535  1 888 225  3 317 603  51 394  14 208 500 TA  4 475 068  1 512 722  6 017 068  72 295  24 512 365 
Slovakia (1999)  -  11 banks  Slovakia (2002)  -  12 banks 
 mean  med  st.dev. min  max   mean  med  st.dev. min  max 
TD  707 231  451 780  907 810  67 844  3 457 758 TD  1 201 995  516 340  1 412 853  58 927  4 322 940 
PC  8 483  4 253  12 310  956  46 374 PC  13 987  5 784  170 050  988  59 299 
FA  36 270  23 379  51 954  2 066  195 023 FA  45 591  27 535  54 982  875  183 267 
TL  478 170  314 498  559 815  55 182  2 165 303 TL  636 750  375 419  652 214  35 139  2 181 838 
NII  15 353  11 872  11 818  454  44 535 NII  36 220  14 490  54 055  436  158 418 







      Descriptive statistics of efficiency scores – CRS                          Table 6a 
  No. DMUs  No. effic. 
DMUs  mean med st.dev. min  max 
1999  59  8  0.6074  0.5839 0.224789 0.1895  1.0000 
2000  72  7  0.5888  0.5377 0.219629 0.2588  1.0000 
2001  70  9  0.6831  0.6171 0.197626 0.2830  1.0000 
2002  62  8  0.6332  0.5868 0.206272 0.1040  1.0000 






      Descriptive statistics of efficiency  scores  –  VRS              Table  6b 
  No. DMUs  No. effic. 
DMUs  mean med st.dev. min  max 
1999  59  21  0.7691  0.7924 0.225985 0.2163  1.0000 
2000  72  21  0.7962  0.8578 0.211820 0.2693  1.0000 
2001  70  22  0.8045  0.8659 0.191907 0.2869  1.0000 
2002  62  12  0.7367  0.7418 0.200694 0.1275  1.0000 
     Source: Author’s calculation 
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         Composition of the efficiency  frontier  –  CRS      Table  7a 
  CZE HUN POL SVK 
  no. % no. % no. % no. % 
1999  4 50.0 1 12.5 3 37.5 0  0.0 
2000  2 28.6 0  0.0  5 72.4 0  0.0 
2001  2 22.2 2 22.2 4 44.5 1 11.1 
2002  4 50.0 3 37.5 1 12.5 0  0.0 





         Composition of the efficiency  frontier  –  VRS      Table  7b 
  CZE HUN POL SVK 
  no. % no. % no. % no. % 
1999  10  47.6 3 14.3 8 38.1 0  0.0 
2000  6 28.6 4 19.1  10  47.6 1  4.7 
2001  6 27.3 5 22.7  10  45.5 1  4.5 
2002  5 41.7 4 33.3 3 25.0 0  0.0 





         Scale inefficiency (in percent)                Table 8 
  CZE HUN POL SVK  V4 
1999  6.26 18.71  27.78 -2.36 13.76 
2000  8.26 24.08  27.56  -14.20  15.85 
2001  10.49 10.28 18.39 -4.63 11.11 
2002  6.75 8.33  16.53  -8.89 7.50 
           Source: Author’s calculation   30



































 Source: Author’s calculation  31
 
Descriptive statistics of enviromental variables – 1999                 Table 9a 
 mean med st.dev. min  max 
ROE  0.0026 0.0633 0.3120 -1.2296 0.5799 
EOTA  0.1288 0.0791 0.1737 0.0096 0.8318 
ln FA  13.6632  13.6945 1.4619 10.3410  16.4964 




Descriptive statistics of enviromental variables – 2000                 Table 9b 
 mean med st.dev. min  max 
ROE  0.0455 0.0788 0.2485 -0.7789 0.4858 
EOTA  0.1009 0.0721 0.1411 0.0126 0.6789 
ln FA  13.7127  13.7418 1.4442 10.3984  16.5569 




Descriptive statistics of enviromental variables – 2001                 Table 9c 
 mean med st.dev. min  max 
ROE  0.0662 0.0865 0.2133 -0.5947 0.4938 
EOTA  0.0931 0.0704 0.1297 0.0145 0.6425 
ln FA  13.8844  13.7742 1.4252 10.3912  16.5726 




Descriptive statistics of enviromental variables – 2002                 Table 9d 
 mean med st.dev. min  max 
ROE  0.0864 0.0961 0.1682 -0.4513 0.4382 
EOTA  0.0835 0.0643 0.0752 0.0206 0.4431 
ln FA  14.0329  13.8842 1.3857 10.5051  16.7763 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 
  coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value coeff. p-value 
intercept  0.84594 0.0000 0.71241 0.0000 0.55436 0.0000 0.91172 0.0000 
CZE  0.29893 0.0000 0.31004 0.0000 0.24463 0.0000 0.30035 0.0000 
HUN  -0.09730 0.0142 0.14196 0.0000 0.29377 0.0000 0.26882 0.0000 
POL  0.19914 0.0000 0.12332 0.0074 0.11162 0.0107 -0.12119 0.0000 
SVK  -0.18252 0.0000 -0.15109 0.0000 -0.10994 0.0000 -0.20883 0.0000 
ROAE  0.10747 0.1834 0.10554 0.1133 0.12007 0.0471 0.16162 0.0324 
EOTA  0.00098 0.7728 -0.00116 0.5967 -0.00788 0.6033 -0.00397 0.6125 
ln TA  -0.00645 0.2423 0.01036 0.0424 0.00743 0.0494 0.00976 0.2581 
FO  0.07491 0.1714 0.08281 0.1053 0.10348 0.0488 0.14590 0.0311 
          
R
2  0.3732  0.3821  0.3649  0.3894  
log-likelih.  17.2602  17.6544  17.0512  17.7567  